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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a wrongful death action brought pursuant to LC. $ 5-311 alleging Respondents
Pocatello School District and Pocatello I-Iigh School negligently failed to protect Cassie Jo
Stoddart from being murdered at the hands of fellow Pocatello High School students Brian
Draper and Tory Adamcik. Appellants allege Respondents are responsible despite the fact that
the murder occurred after school hours and off school grounds, at a time and place where all of
the students were in the care, custody and control of their respective parents.
On January 9, 2009, Respondents filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on the
grounds that: (1) The Respondent School District did not owe a tort duty of care under the
circumstances requiring it to take steps to prevent Stoddart's murder; and (2) The Respondent
School District alternatively argued that it was imrnune from liability pursuant to LC. § 6904A(2), because the duty owed, if any, was an immunized duty to supervise Draper and

Adamcik while in the custody and care of the Respondent School District, even though the
murder had occurred after school hours and off school grounds.
Appellants opposed the motion arguing: (1) The employees of the Respondent School
District breached their duty owed to Stoddard by negligently investigating the allegations against
Draper (characterizing Draper as a "third-party"

- rather

than as a "student under supervision");

and (2) The Responde~lltSchool District is not immunized from liability because it laclced
custody and control over the students at the time of Stoddart's murder, or acted recklessly.
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After reviewing the parties' briefing, and considering the oral argument of counsel, on
March 11, 2009, the District Court agreed with the Respondent School District's position and
issued its decision granting the motion for summary judgment. thereby dismissing all of
Appellants' claims.'
Appellants have appealed the District Court's grant of summary judgment.
B.

STATEMENT OF PACTS

On February 17,2004, almost two and a haif years before the September 22,2006, murder
of Cassie Jo Stoddarl ("Stoddart"), Pocatello Police Officer Kristen Oak ("Officer Oak"), then
acting as the School Resource Officer ("SRO") at Irving Middle School, was called into the
principal's office in reference to a suspicious phone message. (Kristen Oak deposition, dated

9/25/08 ("Oak depo.'y, 3: 17-4:8, C.R. Vol. I, p.110; Detail Incident Report, dated 2/24/04, p.2,
C.R. Vol. I, p.120.) Principal Jim Harrell ("Principal Harrell") and student Gina Dvorak
("Dvorak") were present and they played a brief recording for Officer Oak of a phone
conversation Dvorak had with student Christopher Nix ("Nix") wherein Nix stated "going to
have a school shooting on Tuesday, 17", 2004." (Detail Incident Report, dated 2/24/04, p.2, C.R.
Vol. I, p.120.) The call had been made from Brian Draper's ("Draper") home, but Draper did not
make any threatening comments. (Id.) The subsequent investigation performed by Officer Oak,
Principal Harrell, and Assistant Principal Millie Flandro included a search of Nix's loclcer as
well as interviews of both Nix and Draper, and an interview of Pam Draper - Brian Draper's
mother - at their home. (Detail Incident Report, dated 2/24/04, pp.2-4, C.R. Vol. I, p.120-22.)
The investigation revealed no actual threat existed, and Nix and Draper were warned not to make

'

Respondent School District also raised the issue that it could not be found '3ointly and severally liable" with the
murderers for Stoddart's death. The District Court agreed and dismissed the claim ofjoint and several liability. This
issue is not a subject of the instant Appeal.
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any such statements again - even in a jolting manner. (Detail Incident Report, dated 2/24/04,
p.3-4, C.R. Vol. I, p.122-22.)
Approximately one month later, on March 21, 2004, Officer Oak was approached by two
students, Katherine Moore ("Moore") and Andrew Witcher ("Witcher"), who reported that Nix
had told them while on the bus his thoughts about doing a school shooting and that Nix said that
Draper and Joseph Lacey ("Lacey") were also involved. (Detail Incident Report, dated 3/26/04,
p.2, C.R. Vol. I, p.113; Oak depo., C.R. Vol. I, pp.109-12). Officer Oak conducted a thorough
investigation including interviews of Moore, Witcher, Nix, Draper, Draper's mother - Pam
Draper, Lacey, and Nix's mother, Tanya Nix. (Detail Incident Report, dated 3/26/04, pp.3-7,
C.R. Vol. I, pp. 114-118.) Irving Middle School Principal Harrell assisted in the investigation and
was informed of developments as they occurred. (Deposition of Jim Harrell, dated 9/11/04

flarrelldepo.

'7, 38:SO-39:23; 46:24-47:48:8, C.R. Vol. I, pp.81; 83.)

Regarding the specific allegation Nix had made that Draper was obsessed with
Columbine and wanted to see another Columbine at Irving Middle School, Officer Oak spolce
with Draper and his mother about this allegation and following her investigation was satisfied
that Draper did not pose such a threat. (Oak depo., 47:20-48:17; C.R. Vol. I, p.112; Detail

Incident Report, dated 3/26/04, pp.4-5, C.R. Vol. I, pp. 115-16.)
Principal Harrell similarly believed that the school had conducted a thorough
investigation of the NixIDraper incident in March 2004, and concluded that Draper did not pose
a threat to safety:
Q. In order to clear Draper and allow him to continue at school there,
did you investigate the allegations made against him?
A. Yes. we did.
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Q. Do you remember that you cleared him as being a safe student to
return to Irving?

A. I would go off that, since we didn't carry out any further
disciplinary action against him, that at that time we must have felt that he
was not a threat.

(Harrell depo., 44:9-45:14; C.R. Vol. I, p.82.)
Nix, however, posed a concern to Principal Harrell, and as a result, Nix was transferred to
Kinport Academy. (Harrell depo., 49:lO-24; C.R. Vol. I, p.83; Detail Incident Report, p.6, C.R.
Vol. I, p.100; Afldavil of Christopher Nix, p.3, C.R. Vol. I, p.93.)
Thus, based on the events which had occurred in the early spring of 2004, and following
a thorough investigation by the school's administration and the Pocatello Police Department, it
was determined that only Nix posed a threat to student safety at Irving Middle School, and he
was transferred to Kinport Academy where the classes were smaller and he would receive closer
supervision. Draper, however, was not deemed to be a threat to Irving's students and he was
permitted to stay at the school (as was Lacey). (Warrell depo, 38:19-39:23,45:2-18, C.R. Vol. I,
pp.81-82.)
Two and half years later, in the fall of 2006, student Samantha Chandler ("Chandler")
alleges in an affidavit dated October 15, 2008 (over two years after Stoddard's murder), that she
had found in her locker (which she allegedly shared with Draper) several notes of a threatening
nature, by and between Draper and fellow murderer Tory Adamcik ("Adamcik"). Af$davit of

Samantha Chandler ("Chandler Afl'y), p.2, C.R. Vol. I, p.88.) Chandler claims she informed
both SRO Noah Baca ("Officer Baca") and Pocatello I-Iigh School Vice Principal Robert Parker
("Assistant Principal Parker") about the threatening notes but was allegedly told there was
nothing they could do about it. (Id.) No actual notes have ever been provided to substantiate
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Chandler's claims, nor does either Chandler, or her mother Julie Wilcox, who allegedly read one
of the notes, possesses a specific recollection of the contents of the statements made in the notes.

(Afldavit ofJulie Wilcox, dated January 15, 2009, p.2, C.R. Vol. I, p.85; Samantha Chandler
Deposition, dated January 20, 2009 ("Chandler depo. '7, 28:4-5, C.R. Vol. 11, p.216.) Indeed,
Chandler's recollection is so vague that she is unable to even recall whether the notes referred to
threats to animals or to students:

Q.

When you say threatening, what do you mean by that?

A.

Like how it stated the words, it just seemed threatening, that's all I
remember.

Q.

Threatening against what, animals, society -

A.

Something.

Q.

-- parents?

A.

Just threatening.

Q.

Can you give me some ideas why you deemed it to be threatening?

A.

Like the way - I don't remember exactly what it said but I remember the
words, the way they were written down, it just seemed threatening.

Q.

Now many words, are we talking one sentence?

A.

About three sentences.

Q.

And your general belief is it was threatening. Can you give me any idea
why you would say it was threatening?

A.

Not really.

Q.

Can you think of any word?

A.

It was just scary.
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Q.

Why do you say that? Can you think if any word whatsoever that was in
that note that made you feel that way?

A.

Death.

Q.

And death about whom?

A.

Animals.

Q.

It said lets lcill, what, a cat or -

A.

It just said death, that's one word I can remember out of the whole thing.

Q.

It said death to animals?

A.

I think; it just seemed threatening.

(Chandlev Depo., 28:6-20; 29:4-20, C.R. Vol. 11, p.216.)
In response to the assertions set forth in Chandler's Affidavit, Assistant Priilcipal Parker
testified in his depositioil that he had never spoken with Chandler about Draper or Adamcik, and
that he had never received any notes, whether threatening or not, from Chandler. (Deposition of

Robert Parker, dated 12/16/08 ("Parker depo."), 10:14-11:19; C.R. Vol. 11, p. 194.) Assistant
Principal Parlcer also stated that Chandler and Draper could not have shared lockers because they
were in different grades and had different home rooms. (Parker depo., 16:5-17:5; C.R. Vol. 11,
p.195.) In addition, Officer Baca disputed the legitimacy of Chandler's claims that she had
warned him about the threats contained in the notes when he testified that it would have been
iinpossible for him to have spolten with Chandler prior to the inurder of Stoddard in September
of 2006, because at that time he was away fiom school on medical leave. (Deposition of Noah

Baca, dated 12/16/08 ("Baca Depo. '"j 915-21;C.R. Vol. 11, p.203.)
In addition to the above evidence, Pocatello High School Principal Don Cotant confirmed
that he had no lcnowledge of anything unusual or threatening about Draper prior to Stoddart's
murder. (Deposition of Don Cotant, dated 9/11/04 ("Cotant depo. '7,11:11-14:6, 15:6-10, C.R.
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Vol. I, pp. 74-75.). In fact, Principal Cotant was not even aware that Draper and Adamcik
claimed to have been making a "horror movie" prior to the murder. (Cotant depo., 24:21-25:9,
C.R. Vol. I, 76.)
It is undisputed that on Friday, September 22, 2006, Draper and Ada~ncikbrutally and
senselessly murdered fellow Pocatello high school student Cassie Jo Stoddard at the home of
Frank and Allison Contreras. (Complaint and Demandfor Jury Trial, 77 3, 16, C.R. Vol. I, pp. 2,
4.) It is also undisputed that Draper and Adamcik were arrested, tried and found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt for the murder of Stoddart. (Complaint, 7 19, C.R. Vol. I, p.4.)
Based on the record provided, it is undisputed that Respondents were not provided any
direct, unambiguous notice that either Draper or Adamcik presented an imminent threat of harm
to Stoddart other students at Pocatello High School at any time prior to Stoddart's murder on
September 22,2006
Finally, Appellants admitted in their Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment that Responde~ltslacked custody or control over the students at the time of the murder:
1)

The Defendant School District is not immune ikon1 Plaintiffs' Tort Claims here
because those claims do not "[alrise out of injury to a person or property by a person
under supervision, custody or care of a governmental entity." (Plaintiffs'
Memorandum in Response to Dejmdant Pocatello School District's Motion for
Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffss'Memo.'7, p.14, C.R. Vol. I, p.157.);

2)

"Plaintiffs' Tort Claims Do Not Arise Out of Injury by a Person Under the
Supervision, Custody or Care of the Defendant School District." (Plaintiffs
Memo., p 15, C.R. Vol. I, p.158.);

3)

"Plaintiffs and Defendant School District agree that 'it is undisputed that Draper and
Adamcik murdered Stoddart after school hours, and off school grounds, at a time
when all three students [were] in the care, custody and control of their parents, and
not the District." (Plaintiffs' Memo., p. 16, C.R. Vol. I, p. 159.)

4)

"Because Plaintiffs are not herein alleging that the Defendant School District was
negligent in failing to supervise Draper, or anyone else, the immunity statute cited by
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Defendant School District in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment simply is
not applicable." (Plaintiffs' Memo., p.18, C.R. Vol. I, p.161.)
"Plaintiffs do not contend Draper and Adamcik should be viewed as under the
supervision of the Defendant School District at the time of the murder." (PlaintiSfss'
Memo., p.19, fn.2, C.R. Vol. I, p.162.)

5)

C.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On January 31, 2008, PlaintiffsIAppellants filed their Complaint and Demand for Jury
Trial against DefendantslRespondents Pocatello School District No. 25 and Pocatello High
School.
On March 10, 2008, DefendantsIRespondents Pocatello School District No. 25 and
Pocatello High School filed Pocatello School District's Answer and Demand for Jury Trial.
On January 9, 2009, DefendantsIRespondents Pocatello School District No. 25 and
Pocatello High School filed their Motion for Summary Judgment.
On March 11, 2009, the District Court issued its Decision on Motion for Summary
Judgment dismissing all of Plaintiffs'lAppellants' claims.
On March 30, 2009, the District Court entered its Judgment and Rule 54(B) Certificate of
Final Judgment.
On April 17, 2009, Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal, which was Certified by the
District Court Clerk on April 20,2009.

11. RESTATED AND ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL

A.

RESTATED ISSUES ON APPEAL.

Following are Respondents' restated issues on appeal:
1.

Did Respondents owe a tort duty to protect Stoddart from all foreseeable risks
of harm, including her murder which occurred after school hours and off
school grounds?

2.

Did Respondents owe a tort duty to protect Stoddart after school hours and off
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sc11ool grounds from being murdered by fellow students Draper and Adamcik?

3.

Did Respondents owe a tort duty of care to conduct a competent investigation
of information which could have revealed additional information possibly
making it foreseeable that Draper and Adamcik would murder Stoddart after
school hours and off school grounds?

4.

Under LC. $ 6-904A(2), were Respondents immune from liability where the
alleged negligent supervision of Draper occurred during school hours, on
school property, though Stoddart's murder occurred off school property, after
school hours?

5.

Was the evidence of Respondents' prior investigation of Draper two and a half
years prior to Stoddart's murder, and allegations by Chandler that Draper and
Adamcilc posed an unspecified threat of harm and that she had warned
Respondents of this threat before Stoddart's murder, of a kind and quality
requiring a finding of "reclcIess, willful and wanton" misconduct on the part of
Respondents sufficient to take it outside the scope of the immunity otherwise
provided by L C. $ 6-904A(2)?

B.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL.

1.

Are Respondents entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to LC. $
12-121 and IAR 41?

In the event Respondents are deemed the prevailing party, Respondents hereby claim
entitlement to its reasonable attorney fees pursuant to LC. $12-121 and IAR 41, in addition to its
costs on appeal pursuant to IAR 40,
Respondents are entitled to attorney fees because this Appeal was brought frivolously and
without foundation, and Appellants have failed to make a good faith argument for the extension
of existing law. Martin v. Twin Falls School Distuict, 138 Idaho 146, 150, 59 P.3d 317 (2002).
Specifically, the question whether a school district owes a duty of care to prevent foreseeable
rislcs of harm to students off school property andlor after school hours, has been definitively
answered in the negative. R f e v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846-47, 908 P.2d 143 (1995). And even if
a limited duty to supervise existed under the circumstances, such a claim is immunized pursuant
to LC. gC 6-904A(2). Brooks v. Logan, 130 Idaho 574, 577, 944 P.2d 709 (1997) (Brook II)
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 9

(summary judgment affirmed and school district held immune from liability where student who
had committed suicide at home was found to be a supervised student at the time of the school's
alleged breach of duty); see also, Michelson v. Smith, 127 Idaho 401, 403, 901 P.2d 508 (1995)
(school district immune from claim where student was injured by two other students who were
fighting in a school hallway during school hours); Harris v. Dept. of Health & WeIfare, 123
Idaho 295, 300, 847 P.2d 1156 (1992) (holding department immune from liability pursuant to

LC. $ 6-904A(2) for injuries caused by juvenile who committed a burglary and sexual assault
while under department supervision).
Thus, because the law is clear that Respondents did not owe a tort duty of care under the
circumstances, and was immunized from liability if the duty to supervise was breached, and
Appellants have failed to male a good faith argument for the extension of existing law.
Therefore, an award of reasonable attorney fees to Respondents is appropriate.
111. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Appellate Court's standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is the same as
the district court's standard when considering tile same motion. Sherer v. Pocatello Sch. Dist.

No. 25, 143 Idaho 486, 489, 148 P.3d 1232 (2006). Pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of
Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. The Court exercises free
review over the district court's determination of whether there was a genuine issue of fact, and
also whether the prevailing party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id., citing,

Anderson v. Prof'l Escrow Services, Inc., 141 Idaho 743, 745-46, 118 P.3d 75 (2005).
Interpreting statutes is a question of law over which the Court exercises free review. Carrier v.

Lalze Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 142 Idaho 804, 807, 134 P.3d 655 (2006). Similarly,
determining whether a legal duty exists under the circumstances is a question of law over which
the Court also exercises free review. Freeman v. Juker, 119 Idaho 555, 556-57, 808 P.2d 1300
(1991).
On a motion for summary judgment the moving party bears the burden of proving the
absence of a material fact, and all evidence is construed liberally and all reasonable inferences
are made in favor of the non-moving party. Sherer, 143 Idaho at 489. After the moving party has
satisfied its burden, the non-moving party must then come forward with sufficient admissible
evidence identifying specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 489-90; IRCP

56(e). Such evidence may consist of affidavits or depositions as well as other material based
upon personal knowledge which would be admissible at trial. Id. at 490, citing, ITurris v. State,
Dep't of Health & WeEfare, 123 Idaho 295, 297-98, 847 P.2d 1156 (1992). Although
circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue, a Inere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to
demonstrate the existence of an issue of fact for trial. Sherer, 143 Idaho at 490.
Where a plaintiff seelcs recovery against a governmental entity pursuant to the Idaho Tort
Claims Act ("ITCA"), the Court reviews the motion in light of the following three stages of
analysis:
On a motion for summary judgment ... a court must first determine
whether the plaintiff has stated a valid tort under Idaho law and whether
the ITCA provides immunity, after which it proceeds to consider "whether
the merits of the claim presented for consideration on the motion for
summary judgment entitle the moving part to uudgment]."
Id., quoting, Coonse v. Boise Sch. Dist., 132 Idaho 803,805,979 P.2d 1161 (1999).
IV. ARGUMENT

A.

STATEMENT OF LAW
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This Statement of Law will describe the Idaho tort rules that generally apply to the issues
raised in Appellant's Brief. Subsequent sections of Respondents' Brief will specifically address,
in the order oftheir presentation by Appellants, the issues raised in their Appeal.
As a threshold matter, a school district is a "political subdivision" of the State of Idaho
and is recognized as a body "corporate and politic" under the laws of the State of Idaho. LC. $ 6 -

902(2); LC. $33-301.
Under the common law, the state and its political subdivisions were traditionally immune
from suit under the doctrine of "sovereign immunity." Grant Construction v. Burns, 92 Idaho
408, 412, 443 P.2d 1005 (1968) ("the state cannot be sued without its consent, and that such
consent cannot be implied but must be expressly given by constitutioi~al or statutory
provisions"). The ITCA, passed in 1971, expressly provides the state's consent to be sued, and
also identifies the procedures and limitations to bringing actions against the state and its political
subdivisioi~s.~
LC. $$ 6-901, et seq; Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 458, 886 P.2d
330 (1994) ("The Idaho Tort Claims Act, LC. $$ 6-901 - 929, abrogates the doctrine of
sovereign immunity and renders a governmental entity liable for damages arising out of its
negligent acts or omissions. However, it preserves the traditional rule of immunity in certain
specific situations"); Doe v. Duvtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 471, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986) ("The ITCA
makes every state governmental entity liable for damages arising out of its own negligent acts or
omissions").

The abrogation oC sovereign immunity under the Act is provided as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this act, every g o v e r ~ ~ ~ e nentity
t a l is subject to liability for
money damages arising out of its negligent or otherwise wrongful act or omissions ... where the
govenmental entity if a private person or entity would be liable for money damages under the
laws of the state of Idaho.
1.C $6-903.
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Under the ITCA, when a plaintiff brings a claim against a governmental entity, her claiin
must satisfy the following three step analysis:
First, the plaintiff must state a cause of action for which tort recovery
would be allowed under the laws of Idaho, that is, "whether there is such a
tort under ldaho law." (Citation omitted.) Second, the plaintiff must show
that "[nlo exception to liability under the ITCA shields the alleged
misconduct from liability." (Citations omitted.) Third, if no exception
applies, the plaintiff still must meet the burden of showing that it is
entitled to recovery based on the merits of its claim. (Citation omitted.)
Sherer, 143 Idaho at 490. These elements will be analyzed below.
1.

THEREA CAUSEOF ACTIONFOR WHICHTORTRECOVERYWOULD
ALLOWED
UNDERIDAHOLAW?
IS

BE

The first step in the ITCA analysis is satisfied where a plaintiff's allegations generally
state a cause of action recognized under the laws of Idaho -- such as a negligence claim. Coonse
v. Boise School District, 132 Idaho 803, 805, 979 P.2d 1161 (1999). However, the plaintiff must

also establish that she is entitled to "tort recovery" under the ITCA to establish her claim is
"valid." Sherer, 143 Idaho at 490.
The following discussion analyzes the elements of a plaintiffs prima facie negligence
claim, specifically focusing on the issue of whether or not a school district owes a tort duty of
care under the circumstances where a student is injured by another student after school hours and
off school grounds; and will also discuss the scope ofthe duty, if any exists.
The coinmon law claim of negligence allows tort recovery if and only if all of the
followingprimafacie elements of the claim are satisfied:
(1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to conform to a
certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of duty; (3) a causal connection
between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual
loss or damage.
Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244,247, 985 P.2d 669 (1999), quoting, Orthman v. Idaho Power
Company, 126 Idaho 960,962,895 P.2d 561 (1 995).
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It is a well accepted principal under Idaho's coinnlon law that a plaintiff cannot recover
in a negligence action if she is unable to prove that the defendant owed her a tort duty of care
under the circumstances of her claim: 'YnJo liability arises from the law of torts unless the
defendant owes a duty to theplnintijJ" Martin, 138 Idaho at 150 (emphasis added) (held there
is no duty to investigate the need for crossing guards at designated school crossings where there
is no duty to provide crossing guards at any intersection); Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386,
389, 34 P.3d 1069 (2001) (held no duty for county sheriff to remove roclts from road or to
contact highway district eve11 though it was foreseeable that the rocks could cause a motor
vehicle accident). Thus, for a plaintiff to prove she is entitled to tort recovery based on the merits
of a negligence claim, she must establish the existence of a tort duty requiring the defendant to
take reasonable steps to prevent the harm alleged in the complaint. Id.
Regarding the duty element of a negligence claim, it is also well accepted that "every
person, in the conduct of his or her business, has a duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent
unreasonable, foreseeable risks of harm to others." Turpen, 133 Idaho at 247; Boots v. Winters,
145 Idaho 389, 393, 179 P.3d 352 (Ct. App. 2008), citing, Sharp v. KIT Moore Co., 118 Idaho
297, 300, 796 P.2d 506 (1990).

his tort duty of care, however, has its limits and does not apply

to all persons under all circumstances. Bootx, 145 Idaho at 394.
Specifically, under Idaho law there is no tort duty to control the conduct of others unless

a "special relationship" exists obligating the defendant to take steps to control the actions of a
third party under its custody or control. Litchjeld v. Bonner County, 122 Idaho 416, 420, 835
P.2d 651 (Ct. App. 1992) ("Idaho adheres to the general rule that one does not have a duty to
control the conduct of another"), citing, Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 21 1, 225, 723 P.2d 755
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(1986), and Rest. ( 2 4 Torts $ 315 (1966).~Similarly, there is no duty to act or protect another
unless a legally recognized "special relationship" exists between the defendant and the injured
party warranting the imposition of a tort duty requiring the defendant to take reasonable steps to
protect the injured party. Coughlin v. Untv,ofZdaho, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 987 P.2d 300 (1 999)4
(no duty to protect another absent a "special relationship," citing, Rest. ( 2 4 Touts $ 3 1 4 ~ ) ; ~

A school district has the requisite "special relationship" with its minor students sufficient
to create a common law tort duty, and the resulting duty of care owed by school districts to its
students has bee11described by the Idaho Supreme Court as a duty to supervise the students in its
custody who are participating in activities under its control:

[A] school district bears "a common law duty to protect against ...
reasonably foreseeable risk[s] of harm to a student while in the [dJ&trict7s
custody."
Sherer, 143 Idaho at 490 (emphasis added), quoting, R!fi v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 846,908 P.2d

143 (1995). This common law duty extends to all school activities whether characterized as
required "curricular" activities, or as non-required, but school sponsored, "extra-curricular"
Restatement ( 2 4 Torts $315 provides: "There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent
him kom causing physical harm to another unless: (a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person
which imposes a dnty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or (b) a speclal relation exists between the
actor and the other which gives the other a right to protection.
4

Mere custody and control, however, does not always require the finding of a "special relationship." Coughlin, 133
Idaho at 399. In Coughlin, the court analyzed the dnty question based on "the sum total of those considerations of
policy which lead the law to say that a particular plaintiff is entitled to protection" and concluded that an adult
student, though in the university's care, was not entitled to protection against injury to herself. Id. at 399-400. See
also, Restatement ( 2 4 Torts $ 314A(4) which provides: that a duty to aid or protect may arise only where it is shown
that the defendant is "[olne who is required by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another under
circumstances such as lo deprive the otlzer of hk normal opportunities for proteelion.. . ." (emphasis added.) The
deprivation of the opportunity to protect oneself was not present in Coughlin and also could have provided a basis to
not fnld a duty owed under the circumstances.
Restatement ( 2 4 Torts $ 314 provides: "The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part is
necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action." Restatement
(24 Torts § 314A describes several "special relationships" which impose an affxmative duly to act, and fmds there
is a duty where there is custody of control and the person in custody cannot protect herself: "(4) One who is required
by law to take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another under circumstances such as to deprive the other of
his nomal opportunities for protection is under a similar duty to the other."
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activities. Sherer, 143 Idaho at 491, citing, Bauer v. Minidoka School Dist., 116 Idaho 586, 590,
778 P.2d 336 (1989).

A statutory duty of care to supervise students in a school district's care, custody and
control was created when the legislature passed LC. $33-512(4) which provides: "The board of
trustees of each school district shall have the following powers and duties: .. . (4) To protect the
morals and health of the pupils.. .." This statutory duty, however, is not "an absolute mandate to
prevent all harm" from occurring. Sherer, 143 Idaho at 491. Rather, the statute merely requires a
school district to "act reasonably in supervising its students..." which means a district "has
simply a duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising students while they are attending
school." Coonse, 132 Idaho at 805 (emphasis added). The Idaho Supreme Court has noted that

the passage of LC.

5 33-512(4) "does not create a separate tort or a new cause of action,"

but

"merely supports the existence of a common law cause of action against a school district."

Sherer, 143 Idaho at 491, citing, Coonse, 132 Idaho at 807.
In the following cases, the Idaho Supreme Court found that a school district may have
breached its "duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising students while they are attending

a r ' by failing to take steps to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm to students under its care,
custody and control: Sherer, 143 Idaho at 492 (issue of fact whether district breached its duty of
care where student was injured at a school sponsored carnival even though a subcontractor had
provided the activity which caused the actual injury); Brooltr v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 490, 903
P.2d 73 (1995) ("Brooks I'y (issue of fact whether district breached its duty to supervise a
student who committed suicide at home but had mentioned suicidal thoughts in a school English
project); Bauer, 116 Idaho at 589 (issue of fact whether district breached its duty of care when a
student was injured on a school field playing football before school and in accordance with
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principal's instructions); Czaplicki v. Gooding Joint School District, 116 Idaho 326, 331-32,775
P.2d 640 (1989) (issue of fact whether school principal breached his duty of care when he failed
to call an ambulance to assist a child who had struck his head and passed out); Doe v. Durtschi,
110 Idaho at 471-72 (issue of fact whether duty breached where district retained teacher with
known proclivity to sexually abuse children thereby providing him the opportunity to abuse
additional students who were in the district's care).
In cases where the alleged breach of duty occurred after school hours or of school
grounds the court has found that no duty of care exists under the circumstances. Summers v.

Cambridge .Joint School District, 139 Idaho 953, 956, 88 P.3d 772 (2004) (held school district
owed no duty of care where five year old child was safely dropped of by school bus at designated
location and was later struck by a pick-up truck); Martin, 138 Idaho at 150 (held a school district
does not have a tort duty to investigate whether a crossing guard should be provided at
i

designated school crossings because the district has no duty to provide crossing guards [or
otherwise protect students not in district's custody] - even though such investigation could
possibly prevent injuries); Rife, 127 Idaho at 845-46 (held no tort duty exists where child was
injured while crossing an unguarded street on her way to school because the injury occurred
when the student was not in the district's custody - even though such an injury is foreseeable).
The rationale for the rule limiting a school district's liability to circumstances where the
injured student is in the custody and control of the district at the time of injury is that: "after
school has adjourned for the day, and the students have been released, the parents are free to
resume control over the child's well-being." Rife, 127 Idaho at 846-47. The Idaho Supreme
Court further reasoned that "[ilf we were to impose a duty on each school district to protect its
students outside of school and school hours, they would incur substantial financial and additional
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manpower burdens." Id. at 847. Thus, a school district owes a duty to protect its students only
during times when the children are actually in the school district's custody. Id The Court in Rife
explained that the rationale for finding a duty of care was due to the fact that during school the
parents are not in a position to protect their children while at school, and that it was the school
which was in the better position to care for the students while in school:
We believe the common law duty arose because the parents are not in a
position to protect their children while they are attending school. Thus, the
school district bears that burden while the children are in its custody.
However, after school has adjourned for the day, and the students have
been released, the parents are free to resume control over the child's wellbeing.
Id. (emphasis added).
Based on the above case-law, the line of demarcation is clear: where a school district has
custody and control over a student at the time of an alleged injury (i.e.,there exists a "special
relationship") it has a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the student from harm. Sherer,
143 Idaho at 490; LC. J 33-512(4). Correspondingly, when a student is injured at a time or place
when the district lacks custody and control over the student (i.e., there is no "special
relationship"); the district owes the student no tort duty of care

-

even in cases where a

foreseeable injury could result. Rife, 127 Idaho at 845-46; but see, Brooks I, 127 Idaho at 490
(finding limited duty to warn of suicidal tendencies).
The above school district cases are a sub-set of a broader line of cases which generally
hold that it is the presence or absence of a "special relationship" that is dispositive in cases where
a plaintiff alleges there exists either a duty to control a third person, or a duty to protect another;
and absent the existence of a "special relationship" imposing a tort duty toprevent foreseeable
harm there can be no liability -- even in cases where the alleged injury was foreseeable. Boots,
145 Idaho at 394-95 (landlord had no special relationship with tenant or victim requiring him to
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protect victim from tenant's dog); Udy, 136 Idaho at 391 (no "special relationship" existed
between sheriff and plaintiff creating a legal duty which obligated the sheriff to remove rocks
from the road or to give warnings, even though "reasonable law enforcement actions" could have
prevented the accident which injured the plaintiff); Turpen, 133 Idaho at 248-49 (no "special
relationship" existed between landlord and his tenant and/or a guest of his tenant which was
legally sufficient to require the landlord to investigate his tenant or talce other steps to prevent the
tenant's guest from fatally overdosing on alcohol at tenant's party); Coughlin, 133 Idaho at 399400 (no "special relationship" existed between a university and its adult student sufficient to base
liability because a university does not stand in loco parentis to its adult students); Litchfield, 122
Idaho at 420 (no "special relationship" between county and individual convicted of DUI who had
been authorized by the county to drive himself to an alcohol treatment center but got drunlc on
the way there and had a motor vehicIe accident with plaintiff because the county lacked the
requisite "custody and control" over the DUI driver at the time of the accident); Fagundes v.

State of Idaho, 116 Idaho 173, 774 P.2d 343 (1989) ("even if the state realized or should have
realized that it was necessary for the state to require that [all] helicopters contain homing
beacons, powerful radio transmitters, and medical supplies for the aid or protection of [the
victim], it was not therefore under a duty to require such equipment. Similarly, even if the state
realized or should have realized that [the victim] needed to be rescued on the day of the crash, it
was not therefore under a duty to rescue him" [because there was no special relationship]);

Merritt v. State of Idaho, 108 Idaho 20, 24, 696 P.2d 871 (1985), (held no duty for Department
of Health and Welfare to protect minor held in county jail because Health & Welfare laciced
custody and control over the plaintiff at the time of her the alleged injury, and also had no duty to
control the conduct of the third person who injured her, citing, Rest. (24 Torts, $$314A and 315
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requiring a "special relationship" as a predicate to a tort duty to protect or supervise); see also,

Dore v. Cily ofFairbanks, 31 P.3d 788, 793-94 (Alaska 2001), citing, Rest. (24 Torts, $315 (in
case where husband murdered wife, Alaska Supreme Court held the police owed no duty of care
to protect wife from harm or to prevent husband from injuring her because it did not have
custody and control of either the husband or the wife at the time of the murder, and concluded
there was no tort duty owed despite the court's issuance of an arrest warrant only seven (7) days
prior to the murderlsuicide as a result of the husband's prior threats to murder wife); compare to,

Sterling, 111 Idaho at 224-26 (parole officer - parolee relationship is a "special relationship"
creating a tort duty because the parole officer is charged with and empowered by law to control
the conduct ofthe parolee).
Based on the above case-law, it is clear that one owes no tort duty to protect another from
harm caused by a third person unless he possessed actual custody and control over the injured
person at the time of the harm. Merritt, 108 Idaho at 24, citing, Rest. (24 Torts, $$ 314A and

315 (requiring custody and control as a prerequisite to a tort duty to protect); Rife, 127 Idaho at
845-46 (no duty to protect where no custody and control at time of injury). Similarly, one owes
no tort duty control the conduct of a third person to prevent him from causing harm to another
absent the requisite custody and control over the third par@ at the time of the alleged harm.

Litchfield, 122 Idaho at 420, citing, Rest. (24 Torts, $ 315) (requiring custody and control over
third party as a prerequisite to tort duty to control).
Only if a valid claim remains does the court proceed to the next step under the analysis to
determine whether an exception to liability under the ITCA shields the alleged negligence of the
governmental entity from liability. Sherer, 143 Idaho at 490.
2.

DOESAN EXCEPTION
TO LIABILITY
UNDERTHE ITCA SHIELD THE ALLEGED
M~SCONDUCTFROM LIABILITY?
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If the plaintiff identifies a legally recognized basis for tort recovery, the court's next step
is to determine whether or not an exception under the ITCA shields the governmental entity from
liability.
The exception to liability relevant to the instant Appeal is LC. $6-904A(2), which
provides in pertinent part:
Exceptions to governmental liability A governmental entity and its employees while acting in the course
and scope of their employment and without malice or criminal intent and
without reckless, willful and wanton conduct as defined in section 6-904C,
Idaho Code, shall not be liable for any claim wl~ich:. . . .
2. Arises out of injury to a person or property by a person under
supevvision, custody or care of a governmental entity or by or to a person
who is on probation or parole or any work-release program, or by or to a
person receiving services from a mental health center, hospital or similar
facility.

Coonse, 132 Idaho at 805, quoting, LC. $6-904A(2) (emphasis added).
When this section of Idaho Code is applied to school districts, the clear rule is that a
school district is immune from suit pursuant to LC. $6-904A(2) where the person or persons who
caused the injury to the plaintiff is a student under the supervision of the school district.

Coonse, 132 Idaho at 805-06 (school district immune where third grade girl was molested by a
group of older students); Brooks v. Logan, 130 Idaho 574, 577, 944 P.2d 709 (1997) (Brooks 11)
(school district is immune from liability where the student who had committed suicide was
;~
v. Smith, 127 Idaho
determined to be a supervised student who had injured h i m s e l ~Michelson

When analyzed under the Idaho case-law identified in Section I.C., inza, an alternate basis for finding a school
district not liable under circumstances where a student commits suicide at home would be that there exists no duty
for a school district to protect a student from any injury where he is injured at home because the district lacks the
requisite custody and control over the student at the time of the student's injury as required by Rest. (2d) lbrts 5
315jb). The Idaho Supreme Court in Brooks I had previously analyzed the same tort issue through a lens focused
exclusively on the time when the alleged negligent supervision of the student had occurred (at school) - rather than
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401, 403, 901 P.2d 508 (1995) (school district immune from claim where student was injured by
two other students who were fighting in a school hallway during school hours); see also, Harris

v. Dept. of FZealth & Weyare, 123 Idaho 295, 300, 847 P.2d 1156 (1992) (holding department
immune from liability pursuant to LC. ;S 6-904A(2) for injuries caused by juvenile who
committed a burglary and sexual assault while under department supervision).
The purpose of the immunity provided by LC. $6-904A(2) is "to render the state immune
from the unpredictable acts of third persons ... under the state's custody, supervision, or care."

Harris, 123 Idaho at 299 (emphasis in original). This purpose is clearly served in cases where a
court finds that a school district is immune from liability for an alleged injury to another person
(typically another student) which was caused by the conduct of a student under the school
district's supervision. Coonse, 132 Idaho at 805-06.
The effect of the statutory scheme under the ITCA "is to require a heightened showing of
recklessness, as opposed to mere negligence, for [negligent supervision] claims. In this way,
'[tlhe statute protects against ordinary negligence claims which would significantly impair
effective governmental process, yet allows fair compensation for egregious wrongs'." Sherer,
143 Idaho at 491, quoling FZarris, 123 Idaho at 301.
The "heightened showing of recklessness" is defined at LC ;S 6-904C which provides:
"[Rleckless, willful and wanton conduct" is present only when a person
intentionally and knowingly does or fails to do an act creating
unreasonable risk of h a m to another, and which involves a high degree of
probability that such harm will result.
on the time when the actual harm occurred (at home). See also, Rife, 127 Idaho at 847 (no duty of care owed when
the student has been released to his parents' care). Of course, the specific issue regarding if and when a duty to warn
arises in cases where a student commits suicide is now moot because of the legislature's passage of IC. § 33-532B
which expressly addresses the narrow circumstances where a school district owes a duty to warn of a student's
suicidal tendencies. Carrier v Lake Pend Oreille School Dist , 142 Idaho 804, 807-09, 134 P.2d 655 (2006).
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When determining whether or not alleged conduct is sufficiently egregious to qualie as
"willful and wanton" conduct under

5

6-904C, the key element of the definition is a type of

knowledge which contemplates an element of foreseeablilty, thus requiring evidence showing the
government actor: (1) possessed knowledge that the specific harm which actually occurred was
manifst and ostensible to him; and (2) that the actor realized or should have realized that the
specific harm was highly likely to occur. Harris, 123 Id. at 299. The Idaho Supreme Court
explained that the statute imposes this high standard requiring proof that the governmental entity
had actual knowledge of the specific risk of harm to the victim in order to prevent a debilitating
burden on the state which would require it to protect against a broad range of social risks based
on minimal evidence of prior disruptive behavior:
[T]o hold otherwise would impose a debilitating burden on the state,
requiring it to infer the highest social risk from a ward's minimal antisocial behavior, against which it would have the unequivocal duty to
protect the public. LC. j' 6-904A(2) was intended to render the state
immune from the unpredictable acts of third persons, including . . . persons
under the state's custody, supervision or care.
Id. (emphasis in original); see also, Favnwortk v. RallifJ; 134 Idaho 237, 239-40, 999 P. 2d 892
(2000) (affirmed summary judgment holding no willful and wanton conduct found as a matter of
law in case where prisoner with history of altercations and inability to get along with other
inmates assaulted another prisoner).
Thus absent evidence of "recltless, willful and wanton" conduct, a school district cannot be
found liable for injuries caused by alleged negligent supervision of its students. LC. j' 6-904A(2);
Coonse, 132 Idaho at 805-06.
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If a plaintifrs tort claim survives the court's determination of whether the governmental
entity is immune from tort liability pursuant to I. C. $6-904A(2), the court must then determine
whether the plaintiff has satisfactorily demonstrated that she is entitled to tort recovery.
3.

CAN THE PLAINTIFF
MEETTHE BURDENOF SHOWING
SHEIS ENTITLEDTO
RECOVERY
BASEDON THE MERITSOF HERCLAIM?

The final step of the court's analysis is to determine whether or not the plaintiff can
satisfy her burden of showing entitlement to recovery based on the merits of the claim. Sherer,
143 Idaho at 490. Respondents' position is that Appellants cannot meet this burden, and for the
reasons argued below, the District Court's grant of summary judgment should be affirmed.
Accordingly, the issues raised by Appellants in this appeal will be analyzed based upon the
above discussion of Idaho tort law.

B.

RESPONDENTS OWED NEITHER A COMMON LAW, NOR A
STATUTOIW DUTY TO CONTROL THE CONDUCT OF THE
MURDENRS AFTER SCHOOL HOURS AND OFF SCHOOL GROUNDS

Appellants argue that as a matter of law a school district has a duty to control and protect
all of its students after school hours and off school grounds under all circumstances where it
allegedly had negligently supervised a student during school hours who later causes an injury or
harm to another student. Appellants ' Brief; pp. 19-22. Appellants then conclude that Respondents
therefore owed a duty to protect Stoddard, and to control the actions of the murderers, at a time
when both she and the murders were in the care and custody of their parents. Id. Appellants rely
exclusively on the case of Brooks I,7 to support this purported duty. Id. at pp. 21-22. As will be
explained below, Brooks I has since been limited to its facts (prevention of a suicide). More
importantly, the claims in Brooks I were ultimately dismissed following remand on the school
district's motion for summary judg~nentwhere it was determined that, even if a tort duty did
127 Idaho 484,903 P.2d 7 3 (1995).
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arise under the circumstances of Brooks I, the school district was immune from liability pursuant
to I.C $6-904A(2) for any injuries caused by a student under its supervision [including a student
who committed suicide after school and off school grounds]. Brooks TI, 130 Idaho at 576-77.
Upon the backdrop ofthis duty of care purportedly owed by Respondents, the following analysis
of Idaho tort law is provided.
As a threshold matter, Respondents strongly disagree with Appellants' characterization of
Idaho tort law, and it is Respondents' position that the duty of care announced in Brook I has
been limited to only the specific circumstance where a school district possessed some knowledge
, ~ that this limited duty should not be extended to other
of a student's intent to commit s u i ~ i d eand
circumstances where one student harms another student after school hours and off school
property. Rife, 127 Idaho at 846-47 (where the Court held that a school district's duty of care is
limited to circumstances where the district has custody and control ofthe student - therexfter it is
the parents who are responsible for the safety of the child; reasoning to hold otherwise would
impose a debilitating financial burden on the State's school districts). Based on the holding and
reasoning in Rife, the District Court below was correct in holding no duty of care

-

whether

statutory or under the common law - arose under the circumstances of Stoddart's murder, and
granted the District's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Decision on Motion for Summary
Judgment, C.R., Vol. 11, p. 244.)
In the event this Court finds that a tort duty of care could exist under the circumstances of
the instant Appeal, that duty should be a narrow one, similar to the narrow duty to warn of
suicidal tendencies implemented by the Legislature following the Court's decision in Brooks I. A

Carrier, 142 Idaho at 808 (wherein the Court explained that its holding in Brooks I was limited to preventing
suicides: "In Brooks I, this Court found that I.C. f 33-512(4) created a duty in school districts "to act affirmatively to
prevent foreseeable hann to its students." 127 Idaho at 490, 903 P.2d at 79. This duty extends to the prevention of
suicide. Id.")
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review of the Idaho Supreme Court's analysis of I.C. $33-512B is instructive in determining the
scope of a school district's tort duty, if any, to prevent a student's murder after school hours and
off school property.
In passing LC. § 33-512B the Legislature focused and narrowed the scope of a school
district's duty to warn of a student's suicidal tendencies to the specific circumstances described
as follows:
(I) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 33-512(4), Idaho Code,
neither a teacher nor a school district shall have a duty to warn of the
suicidal tendencies of a student absent the teacher's knowledge of
direct evidence of such suicidal tendencies.
(2) "Direct evidence" means evidence which directly proves a fact
without inference and which in itself, if true, conclusively establishes
that fact. Direct evidence would include unequivocal and
unambiguous oral or written statements by a student which would not
cause a reasonable teacher to speculate regarding the existence of the
fact in question; it would not include equivocal or ambiguous oral or
written statements by a student which would cause a reasonable to
speculate regarding the existence of the fact in question.
(3) The existence of the teacher's knowledge of the direct evidence
referred to in subsections (1) and (2) of this section shall be
determined by the court as a matter of law.

Idaho Code ;S 33-512B.
In the case of Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille School ~istrict:The Idaho Supreme Court
was asked to interpret the term "suicidal tendencies" which would trigger a teacher's duty to
warn. Id at 807. Specifically, the Court was asked to determine whether the term should be
given a broad definition resulting in expansive circumstances where a teacher would be required
to warn of a student's "suicidal tendencies;" or whether the term should be given a narrow
interpretation resulting in a well-defined, specific duty to warn. Id. at 808-09

142 ldaho 804, 134 P.3d 655 (2006).
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In its analysis, the Court first looked at the history of the Legislation and noted that the
statute was passed in response to the Court's holding in Brooks I wherein the Legislature
determined that the Court had articulated a broad tort duty:

[A] teacher and a school district have a duty to warn or otherwise take
action when confronted with ambiguous, circumstantial evidence of a
student's suicidal tendencies.
Carrier, 142 Idaho at 808, quoting, Statement of Purpose, RS 05763. The Court in Carrier
explained that the statutory duty arising from LC. S; 33-512(4) as announced in Brooks I, was
limited to the prevention of suicide only, and that the resulting legislation further narrowed the
scope of that duty:
In Brooks I, this Court found that L C. 33-512(4) created a duty in school
districts "to act affirmatively to prevent foreseeable harm to its students."
127 Idaho at 490, 903 P.2d at 79. Thk duty extends to the prevention of
suicide. Id. ... However, when faced with this decision, the Legislature
adopted LC. S; 33-512B specifically to narrow the duty of a teacher to
warn of suicidal tendencies.

Carrier, 142 Idaho at 808 (emphasis added).
As part of its analysis, the Court found that the Legislatx~rehad been fully aware of the
"damages caused by suicides and the risks suicide presents to students and their families.. ." yet
chose to pass legislation which narrowed the scope of a school district's duty to warn announced
in Brook I. Id. The Court determined that as a matter of public policy a broad duty of care
would result in an unacceptable burden on teachers andschool districts:
Turning to policy considerations it becomes clear that using a broad
definition of "suicidal tendencies" would create an unworltable and
undesired result for educators.. .. Without [a] clear-cut [narrow] definition,
any time a student mentions death or suicide a teacher would be required
to warn parents andor other authorities. Such a duty would be practically
unworkable - consuming teacher's short and valuable time.. . . [I]f the
statute is interpreted broadly, it "would necessitate that school district
personnel spend countless hours scrutinizing their student's [sic] work for
any reference of any past thought or reference regarding suicide, no matter
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how obscure or remote in time the thought may have occurred, in order to
fulfill the heightened duty to warn others."

Id. at 808-09." After examining the legislative history and considering relevant public policy
objectives, the Court in Currier interpreted the term "suicidal tendencies" narrowly to mean "a
present aim, direction or trend toward taking one's own life." Id. at 809.
The above analysis and policy considerations apply with equal force to the tort rule
proposed by Appellants. Appellants' proposed broad duty to investigate and act every time a
school district obtains some information, no matter how vague, mentioning threatening behavior
by a student, "would create an unworkable and undesired result for educators." Currier, 142
Idaho at 808. Such a broad rule would necessitate that school district personnel spend countless
hours scrutinizing their students' conduct for all references to any past or present thoughts,
statements or writings regarding potential harm to another student, no matter how obscure or
remote in time the thought, statement or writing may have occurred, in order to fulfill the
Respondents' heightened duty to act to prevent harm to other students. Id. at 808-09. Based on
the considerations identified by the Court in Carrier, any tort duty imposed on a school district
exposing it to liability for injuries to students which occur after school hours and off school
grounds must be a very narrow one that can only be triggered when a school district receives
"direct evidence" of a student's "present aim, direction or trend toward the taking of [another's]
life." Carrier, 142 ldaho at 809. As will be explained below, such evidence is not present in the
instant case.

I0

One of the burdens the Court in Carrier found to be onerous was the duty to investigate (scrutinize) every school
record to determine whether a student possessed or had exhibited some vague suicidal tendency in the past which
would trigger a duty to warn. Appellants advocate a similarly burdensome duty here which would be as great, if not
greater, than the duty to investigate rejected by the Court in Carrier, and should similarly be rejected here.
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Finally, if recognized, the existence of Appellants' proposed tort duty to act to protect
students after school hours and off school grounds, should, as required by LC. $ 33-512~," be

determined as a matter of law by the Court and not be left to a jury acting as finder of fact.
Carrier, 142 Idaho at 809 (finding that the suicide victim's essay failed to unambiguously
describe a "present aim, direction or trend toward the taking" of his own life, and concluding as a
matter of law that the district did not owe a duty to warn under the circumstances).
In the instant Appeal, Appellants have based the Respondents' alleged tort duty to act on
an incident which had occurred in 2004, wherein it was alleged that Draper had expressed a
desire to commit a Columbine type massacre Appellants' Brief; pp. 4-7; and also upon nonspecific and disputed claims made by student Samantha Chandler, which were based solely upon
notes from one of the murderers she had allegedly seen (and did not produce), which caused her
to vaguely believe that something bad was about to happen. Appellant's BrieL pp. 13-14; Depo.

ofSamantha Chandler, 28:4-29:20, C.R., Vol. 11, p. 216. Such vague and remote evidence fails
as a matter of law to qualify as the type of specific, uunmbiguous evidence of a student's

"present aim, direction or trend toward the taking of [another's] lije" which should be required
to justify imposing a duty to act under the circumsta~cesof Stoddart's murder. Respondents
therefore, under the circumstances of this case, owed no tort duty requiring it to talte steps to
prevent Stoddart's murder from occurring after school hours and off school grounds. Carrier,
142 Idaho at 808-09.

" The relevant

portion of1.C. $33-512B provides that:
The existence of the teacher's Itnowledge of the direct evidence referred to in subsections
(1) and (2) of this section shall be determined by the court as a matter of law.
I C $33-5/2B(3).
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Based on the above, the District Court's finding that Respondents owed no tort duty of
care under the circumstances, and its grant of summary judgment against Appellants on the issue
of liability should therefore be affirmed.

C.

THERE IS NO DUTY TO ACT TO PROTECT OTHERS WITHOUT THE
REQUISITE
"CUSTODY
AND
CONTROL"
JUSTIFYING
RECOGNITION OF A LEGALLY PROTECTED "SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP"

Appellants assert that a broad duty of care exists under circumstances where a school
district receives some information making it foreseeable that a third person poses a risk of harm
to students, thereby requiring it to take precautions to protect its students. Appellant's Brie6 pp.
22-25. Appellants cite to multiple Idaho cases which held that a school district owes a duty to act
to protect its students from foreseeable risks of harm. Id. Appellants, however, fail to
acknowledge or recognize that in every case cited, the students protected were in the custody ov

contvol of the district at the time of their injury - a crucial fact which is dispositive of the issues
presented in this Appeal. Shere r, 143 Idaho at 492 (student injured at a school sponsored
carnival even though a subcontractor had provided the activity which caused the actual injury);
Coonse, 132 Idaho at 805 (third grade girl assaulted by older students during school hours and
on school grounds); Michelson, 127 Idaho at 403 (student injured in school hallway during
school hours when two other students were fighting); Bauer, 116 Idaho at 589 (student was
injured on a school field playing football before school and in accordance with principal's
instructions); Czaplicki, 116 Idaho at 331-32 (school principal breached his duty of care when he
failed to call an ambulance to assist a child who had struck his head and passed out at school);
Durtschi, 110 Idaho at 471-72 (district retained teacher with known proclivity to sexually abuse
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children thereby providing him the opportunity to abuse additional students who were in the

district's care).
In cases where the school district lacks custody and control at the time of the injury, there
is no duty to act - even ifthe risk of harm to the students was foreseeable and tlze injury which
occurred w m preventable. Rife, 127 Idaho at 846-47 (no duty to protect child walking to

school); Martin, 138 Idaho at 148-50 (no liability for failure to provide crossing guards at all
designated school crossings, and holding where there is no duty to act there is no duty to
investigate, even if investigation could prevent foreseeable injuries); Summers, 139 Idaho at 956
(no duty where student was safely dropped off by school bus at designated location).
Appellants contend that the focus of their argument is not an alleged duty to control the
murderers (over whom the District did not have custody and control); rather it was Respondents'
purported duty to protect Stoddart from harm by further investigating the murderers in order to
prevent the murder from occurring. Appellants' BrieJ p. 24. Appellants cite to no case law in
support of this novel theory which apparently would also make law enforcement agencies
potentially liable in tort for failing to investigate a murderer in order to prevent him or her from
performing a subsequent murder."
Lacking legal authority directly on point, the closest analogous Idaho case is Coonse v.

Boise School District, wherein the Court rejected the plaintiffs attempt to distinguish between
the negligent supervision of the students who caused the injury (immunity present), and the
alleged negligent supervision of the injured student (no immunity), in a vain attempt to avoid the
district's immunity to liability under LC. J 6-904A(2). Coonse, 132 Idaho at 577. Here,
Appellants are similarly arguing distinctions without a difference in a desperate attempt to both:

''

Not even law enrorcelnent agencies are held to such a rigorous standard of care. See, Dove, 31 P.3d 788 (holding
police owed no duty to protect a murder victim absent "threats of imminent, life-threatening, assaultive conduct
when given sufficient specific information to respond").
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(1) establish Respondents owed a tort duty of care under the circumstances; and (2)
simultaneously avoid Respondents' immunity under the ITCA. Appellants' position fails as a
matter of law.
Appellants content that Respondents owed a duty of care to protect Stoddart at a time and
place when she was not in the District's custody and control. However, it is hornbook law that
there is no duty to protect another absent the presence of a "special relationship." Coughlin, 133
Idaho at 399; Summers, 139 Idaho at 956 (a school district's duty to prevent foreseeable harm to
its students "does not extend beyond the time the child is in the school district's control or
custody" meaning at the time school is adjourned and the students go home). Thus, as a threshold
matter, when analyzing whether a school district owes a tort duty of care to protect a student, the
court must first find there existed sufficient cnstody and control over the student at the time of
the injury sufficient to conclude that there existed a protected "special relationship" justifying the
imposition of the duty. Id.
In this case, the record is undisputed, and Appellants have admitted, that Stoddart was
murdered afier school hours and off school grounds; and Respondents therefore lacked custody
and control over Stoddart: at the time of her murder. Appellant's RrieA pp. 4, 14; Complaint and

Demand for Jury Trial, C.R., Vol. I, p, 4; Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Response to Defendant
Pocatello School District's Motion for Summavy Judgment, C.R., Vol. I, p. 159; Defindant
Pocatello School District No. 25 Memorandum in Support ofilfotion for Summary Judgment,
C.R., Vol. I, pp. 30-31. Thus, because Respondents lacked custody or control over Stoddart at
the time of her murder, they owed no duty of care to protect her from any harm. Summers, 139
Idaho at 956; Rife, 127 Idaho at 847. Indeed, the sole justification for imposing a tort duty of care
on schools relies exclusively on the fact that while in school the students are in the district's

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 32

custody and control; and the parents lack the opportunity to care for or protect their children (i.e.,
the school stands in loco parentis). Baueu, 116 Idaho at 588 ("The role of the state to children in

R@, 127 Idaho at 847
school is a parental one often being described as one in l~coparentis");'~
("We believe the common law duty arose because the parents are not in a position to protect
their children while they are attending school"). The legal justification for imposing a tort duty

of care evaporates once school is adjourned and the parents resume custody and control over
their children. R$e, 127 Idaho at 847 ("[Alfier school has adjourned for the day ... the parents
are free to resume control over the child's well-being"). Thus, it follows that at the time of
Stoddart's murder at the home of Appellants Frank and Allison Contreras, Respondents had
neither the obligation nor the opportunity to protect her from harm (both now being the
responsibility of her parents) and Respondents therefore owed no duty of care to Stoddart at the
time of her murder. Summers, 139 Idaho at 956; Rife, 127 Idaho at 847; see also, Merritt, 108
Idaho at 24-25 (Department of Health & Welfare held not responsible for a minor's injuries
received in county jail at hands of another inmate, even though the Department had placed the
juvenile in the county jail, because Department lacked custody and control over the juvenile at
the time of her injury and it was the jail, being the entity with custody and control over the
juvenile at the time, which owed the duty of care to the juvenile).
For the above reasons, the District Court below was correct in finding Respondents did
not owe Stoddart a duty of care at the time of her murder, and its grant of summary judgment
should be affirmed.
j 3 In locoparentis describes a relationship where a person or entity is charged with the rights and responsibilities of
a parent:
A person in loco parentis is "charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and
responsibilities." Black's Law Dictionary (4"' ed. 1951). "A person in loco parentis to a
child is one who means to put himself in the situation of the lawful ... [parent] of the
child with reference to the ... [parent's] office and duty of malting provision for the
child."
Pope v. State ofMaryland, 284 Md. 309,322, 396 A.2d 1054, 1063 (Md. Ct. App. 1979).
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D.

UNDER THE "PUBLIC DUTY RULE" RESPONDENTS DID NOT OWE A
DUTY TO COMPETENTLY INVESTIGATE REPORTS TO DETERMINE
WHETHER DRAPER POSED A RISK OF HARM TO OTHER
STUDENTS

Appellants contend Respondents breached a voluntary duty of care owed to Stoddart
when the School District failed to competently investigate reports made in 2004 that Draper
allegedly posed a threat to other students in the District. Appellants ' BrieJ;p. 27.
Appellants' statement of the above-identified duty of care is erroneous in several
respects. First, by investigating Draper back in the spring of 2004, the District was merely
satisfying its existing general duty of care under the common law and pursuant to LC. j 33-

512(4) to take reasonable steps to protect the students in its custody from harm, and did not
thereby assume some new and additional duty to conduct a competent investigation. See, Udy,
136 Idaho at 389 ("it is possible to create a duty where one previously did not exist"). In this
case, there was no undertaking of a new duty which did not previously exist. Rather, there was
simply Respondeilts' satisfaction of an existing general duty of care. Respoildents easily satisfied
the general duty of care it owed to its students in 2004, when it promptly and thoroughly
responded to the allegations Nix had leveled against Draper by involving the Pocatello Police
Department, by interviewing and disciplining student Christopher Nix, and by interviewing both
Draper and his mother. Ayf of Christopher Nix, C.R. Vol. I, pp. 92-93; 96-101; Depo. of Jim

Hawell, dated 9/11/08, C.R. Vol. I , pp. 81-83; Depo. ofKristen Oak, dated 9/25/08, C.R. Vol. I ,
pp. 111-12. This evidence is undisputed, and there was no breach of any tort duty owed by
Respondents.
Second, under Idaho law, a school district does not owe a specific duty to conduct
research or investigation for the purpose of protecting its student from foreseeable risks of harm
which occur off school property. &tin,
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138 Idaho at 150. In fact, contrary to Appellants'

position, the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly found as a matter of public policy that the use
of school resources for purposes other than educating students represents policy justification for
deciding not to extend a tort duty outside the classroom. Carrier, 142 Idaho at 808-09; Rife, 127
Idaho at 847.
The third reason for rejecting the broad duty to competently investigate advocated by
Appellants, is the "public duty rule" which states that a governmental entity owes no duty to
conduct a competent irzvestigation to protect another from harm except under a speczfic statute
reflecting the State Legislature's intent to impose such a duty. Rees v. Idaho, Dept. of Health &

Welfare, 143 Idalio 10, 15, 137 P.3d 397 (2006) (analyzing issue whether Department of Health
& Welfare had a duty to competently investigate a reported case of child abnse).14

In a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, the Idaho Supreme Court in Rees, addressed the
application of the "public duty rule" to facts where an abused child was returned to his fanily by
the Department and was ultimately murdered, and held under the facts of that case that the
Department did owe a duty to competently investigate reports of child abuse because, bypassing
the Idaho Child Protection Act ("ICPA'Y),the Legislature had created a special relationship
between the Department and abused children which "goes far beyond that ofpolice or other
l 4 The "public duty rule" cited by the Idaho Supreme Court in Rees v. Department of Health & Welfare is defmed as
follows:
Geilerally, a person has no common law duty to prevent a third person from injuring
another unless there is some kind of special relationship. Andrade, 391 N.W.2d at 841;
Restatement (Second) of Torts 5 315 (1965). Applying this principle to governmental
torts in what is called the "public duty rule" requires that a gover~unentalunit owe the
plaintiff a duty different from that owed to the general public in order for the
gover~unentaiunit to be found liable. Cracrajt, 279 N.W.2d at 806. In other words, a
purely "public duty"--as opposed to a "special dutyu--cannot give rise to government tort
liability. Id. Our decision in Cracrajt set out the test for determining whether a special
duty exists. Id. at 806-07. Under Cracrajl, tlze existence of a statute or ordinance is not
sufficient to create a special dufy; instead, a special duly of care arises only when "there
are additional indicia that the [governmental u~lit]has undertaken the responsibility of not
only protecting itself, but also undertaken the responsibility of protecting a particular
class of persons" from the risks associated with a particular harm. Id. at 806.
Radke v. Counfy ofFreeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788,794 (Mum. 2005) (emphasis added).
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investigaive agencies and crime victim." Rees, 143 Idaho at 18.15 In finding that the

Department had a duty to competently investigate child abuse cases, the Court emphasized the
fact that the "legislature has created a duty owed to a narrow, easily identified class of persons to
be protected from a particular harm." Id. The Court emphasized that the Legislature had assigned
primary responsibility to the Department to implement the goals of the ICPA, and had also
empowered the Department with the authority "to do all things reasonably necessary" to carry
out the goals of the Act. Id. at 17-18 (also citing several provisions of the Idaho Administrative
Procedures Act ("IDAPA") which require specific actions for the protection of abused children).
Specifically, the Court found several statutory elements existed in Rees which justified finding
the Department owed a tort duty to competently investigate reports of abused children because:

(1) The statute creates a class of mandatory reporters; (2) The statute encourages reports of child
abuse to the Department by immunizing persons who make a good faith report of abuse or
neglect; and (3) the ICPA mandates creation of multidisciplinary teams to investigate the reports
of abuse

-

demonstrating the Legislature's goal of providing professional investigation of

suspected abuse in order to protect the at-risk child. Rees, 143 Idaho at 18, citing, LC. §§ 16-

1605, 1606, 1617.

15

In reaching its decision, fie Idaho Supreme Court identified atid relied on the following factors stated by the
Minnesota Supreme Court in Radke, to determine whether an exception to the "public duty rule" exists justifying
imposition of a duty of care to protect a particular plaintiff:
(I) Whether the governmental unit had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition;
(2) Whether there was reasonable reliance by persons on the governmental unit's
representations and coilduct (such reliance must he based on specific actions or
representations which cause the person to forego other alternatives of protecting
themselves);
(3) Whether an ordinance or statute set forth mandatory acts clear& for the protection of
aparticular class ofpersons rather than the public as a whole; and
(4) Whether the governmental unit used due care to avoid increasi~lgthe risk of harm.
Radlce, 694 N.W.2d at 794 (emphasis added.)
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None of the factors identified by the Idaho Supreme Court in Rees which justified
imposing a tort duty on Health & Welfare to competently investigate a risk of harm to abused
children, is present in the instant Appeal:
1. Respondents had no prior knowledge that the murderers had
plans to kill Stoddarl;
2. Respondents made no representations to anyone that it would
protect Stoddart (or others) from harm caused by Draper and Adamcik
which could occur after school hours and off school grounds; and
3. There existed no statute or ordinance which set forth mandatory
actions Respondents were required to follow for the protection of potential
crime victims.

Rees, 143 Idaho at 16.
Appellants have therefore failed to identify any basis in fact or law to justify imposing a
duty on Respondents to competently investigate reports Draper allegedly posed a risk of harm to
other students. In the instant Appeal there is simply no basis upon which to find an exception to
the "public duty rule" which states that a public entity does not have a duty to act or protect

another, absent the presence of specific circumstances which clearly indicate legislative intent to
impose such a duty on the governmental entity. Rees, 143 Idaho at 17-19. Indeed, the Idaho
Supreme Court in Rees indicated that not even investigative entities, such is police departments,
have a duty to competently investigate reports to protect crime victims absent the very specific
requirements enumerated above. Rees, 143 Idaho at 18. Thus, a school district, which undeniably
is not an investigative agency, cannot be held to a legal obligation to competently investigate
reports of suspicious behavior to protect crime victims at a level that is higher than that required
of police departments. Id.; see also, Carrier, 142 Idaho at 808-09 and Rip, 127 Idaho at 847,
holding that as a matter of public policy tort duties will not be extended where additional
expense and investigation are required of school districts
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In conclusion, under the "public duty rule," Appellants' contention that Respondents
were obligated to competently investigate reports that one of the murderers may pose a risk of
harm to other students, in order to protect those students who may be injured off campus and
after school hours fails as a matter of law, and cannot provide a legal basis for reversing the
District Court's grant of summary judgment below.

E.

Z.C. $6-904A(Z) PROVIDES RESPONDENTS COMPLETE IMMUNITY

TO ALL OF APPELLANTS' CLAIMS
Appellants point to the District Court's "failure to consider the liability of the School
District based upon the negligence of its employees involved in the investigation of Draper" as a
basis for reversing the District Court's grand of summary judgment below. Appellants ' Brief;p.
30. Apparently, Appellants believe an employee's negligent investigation of a student's risk of
harm to other students (purportedly outside immunity), is sufficiently different than an
employee's failure to supervise a student who poses a risk of harm to other students (where
immunity would apply) to warrant disregarding the immunity provided under the ITCA. In
support of this phantom distinction, Appellants assert that "[blecause Plaintiffs have not alleged
that the School District was negligent in failing to supervise Draper, or anyone else, the
immunity statute cited by the School District in support of its motion for summary judgment is
not applicable." Id. at 31. Appellants conclude that "[ilf Draper's murder of Cassie l o 'was a
foreseeable result of the school's negligence,' I.C. § 6-904A(2) would provide the School
District with no immunity for its negligence in conducting the prior investigation into whether
Draper posed a threat to others within the school district." Id. Unfortunately for Appellants, the
conclusion they seek fails to follow their misstated premise.
Appellants cannot avoid the immunity afforded by I. C. § 6-904A(2) simply by stating that
they have not alleged there was negligent supervision of the murders (students), but have instead
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alleged negligence in failing to protect Stoddard and other students from the risk of harm posed
by the murderers (students). Appellants' Brief, p. 31. The Idaho Supreme Court has already
rejected an appellant's attempt to disregard or recharacterize a district's negligent supervision of
students in an effort to avoid the immunity provided by LC. $ 6-904A(2). Coonse, 132 Idaho at
806. In Coonse, the appellant argued that the school district was negligent for failing to properly
supervise the injured student, and not the students who caused the injury. Id. The Court rejected
this distinction and concluded "[alllowing such a result would be contrary to the intent of LC. $
6-904A, which is to limit the liability of government entities for injuries caused by those under
their supervision, custody, or care." Id.
Moreover, Appellants have previously relied on Brooh I to argue Respondents breached
the murderersistudents on school grounds
its duty of care for its failure to s~~erviseiinvesti~ate,'~
and during school hours in order to find Respondents were responsible for the harm to Stoddard
even though it occurred after school hours and off school grounds. Appellants ' Brief, pp. 20-21.
Thus, as in Brooks II, Appellants' claims must fail because they are based on Respondents'
alleged negligent supervision/investigation of the siudents/nlurderers which had admittedly
occurred during school hours and on school property. Brooks 11, 130 Idaho at 576-77 (noting the
analogous argument that "failure to provide hallway monitoring" (in Mickelson) was a
"supervisory activity").
Appellants' argument that the school district employee's negligence was a "failure to
investigate" rather than a "failure to supervise" is a quintessential "distinction without a
difference," and Appellants' wrongful death claim alleging negligent supervision of the
murderersistudents fails as a matter of law because it cannot survive the Court's scrutiny of the

''

As an analogy, Appellants' alleged "negligent investigalion" of a student's activities is a "supervisory activity,"
just as an alleged failure to "monitor hallways" is a supervisory activity. See, Michelson, 127 Idaho at 403.
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second step of its ITCA analysis, and the District Court's grant of summary judgment below
should therefore be affirmed. Coonse, 132 Idaho at 806; Brooks 11, 130 Idaho at 576-77;

Mickelson, 127 Idaho at 403.

F.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF RECKLESS, WILLFUL OR WANTON
CONDUCT SUFFICIENT TO TAKE RESPONDENTS OUTSIDE THE
IMMUNITY PROVIDED BY LC. $6-904A(2)

Appellants alternatively argue that if the Court should find that the murderslstudents were
under the "supervision" of Respondents, then the immunity provided under LC. $ 6-904A(2)
would nonetheless fail to apply because Respondents' failure lo supervise was a result of
reckless, willful and wanton misconduct. Appellants' BrieJ pp. 33-34. However, contrary to
Appellants' position, there exists not even a scintilla of evidence in support of this allegation and
it therefore fails as a matter of law and the summery judgment below should therefore be
aflinned. Farnworth, 134 Idaho at 239 (summary judgment dismissing under analysis of LC. $

6-904C affirmed); Brooks 11, 130 Idaho at 576 (summary judgment finding immunity affirmed,
district's knowledge of student's journal notes considering suicide did not preclude immunity);

Harris, 123 Idaho at 299 (summary judgment affirmed). Appellants contend that the remote
reports from 2004, and the vague and disputed claims of Samantha Chandler suffice to establish
the requisite reclcless conduct under LC. $ 6-904A(2) and LC.

J 6-904C to take Respondents

outside the immunity from liability under the ITCA. Appellants' BrieA p. 36. Appellants'
argument here fails as a matter of law because they have failed to demonstrate the requisite level
of the foreseeability of the spec@ harm (the murder of Stoddart) required to find that reckless,
willful and wanton conduct existed which would take Respondents outside the immunity under
the Act. Harris, 123 Idaho at 299.
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Appellants' specifically cite to the Idaho Supreme Court cases of Smith v Board of

Corrections, and Caflerty v Idaho Department of ~rans~ortation,'~
for the flawed proposition
that a government entity's knowledge of a risk always requires legal responsibility under Idaho
Code 5 6-904C in the event that risk later causes harm. Appellants' BrieJ; pp. 34-35.
Appellants have misstated the application of Section 6-904C to the facts of both Sinith
and Cafferw. Appellants' cursory analysis of these cases fails to accurately describe the level of
foreseeabilty required by LC. J 6-904C to defeat the governmental immunity otherwise available
under LC. J 6-904A(2). Indeed, the cases cited by Appellants actually support Respondents'
position by contrasting the type of specific evidence required to prove "reckless, willful and
wanton conduct" required by LC.

J 6-904C, to

the vague, remote, and disputed information

allegedly received by Respondents prior to Stoddart's murder.

In Smith, two prison inmates had suffered severe hand injuries when they were required
to malce "stop dado" cuts in hardwood using a table saw lacking the necessary safety equipment
which would have prevented their hand injuries. Smith v Board of Corrections, 133 Idaho 519,
521,988 P.2d 1193 (1999).
In finding for the inmates, and reversing summary judgment granted by the District Court
below, the Idaho Supreme Court found:
The record establishes that [the inmates] worked in a shop with a civilian shop
supervisor who was a State employee in the Correctional Industries Work
Program. [The inmates] were injured doing assigned shop work. Sxfety guards
had been removed from the saws. A reasonable inference can be drawn that the
shop supervisor knew this fact and allowed or approved operation of the shop in
l7 In CafJerty, the Idaho Supreme Court held an issue of fact existed because the Department of Transpollation had
issued a driver's license to an "habitual diunk" in violation of Idaho Code 5 49-303 which expressly prohibited the
issuance of the license; which the Court held could be considered knowing, recltless conduct under 6-904C. This
holding is limited to these facts which are not applicable to the instant case; unless one makes the argument that
Respondents had actual notice that Draper was a "habitual murder," and a statute was present requiring Respondents
to act in a specific manner which would have prevented the harm froin occurring. Cafferty, 144 Idaho 324,332, 160
P.3d 763 (2007). Obviously, no such evidence is present in this case. See also, discussion of "public duly rule" at
Section IV, supra.
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this manner. It can also be inferred that operating woodwork within inches of an
ullshielded power saw is very hazardous. There is sufficient admissible evidence
that a jury could find that the State's conduct was reckless, willful and wanton,
because the State employee supervising the worker i~unateswho instructed [the
inmates] to perform the dado cuts knew that the safety guards had been removed
from the saws [and that the specific harm suffered by the inmates was highly
likely to occur].
Smith, 133 ldaho at 524
Thus, by applying the standard set forth in ldaho Code § 6-904C to the facts in Smith, the
Supreme Court found both:

1.

That prison officials had knowledge of facts demonstrating the specific harm
was obvious; and

2.

That prison officials also had knowledge of facts which would cause one to
conclude that the specz>c harm was Izighly likely to occur.

Smilh, 133 Idaho at 524.
In other words, the prison officials in Smith had direct, obvious and u~lambiguous
evidence that the table saw without the safety guard could severely injure a user, and that the
prison officials also knew that inmates were actually using the unguarded saw in such a manner
making it highly likely that such an injury was imminent. Id.
The high standard which requires foreseeabilify of the specific harm was created by the
Legislature to prevent an onerous burden from being imposed on government entities supervisiiig
unpredictable third persons:
[Tlo hold otherwise would impose a debilitating burden on the state,
requiring it to infer the highest social risk from a ward's minimal antisocial behavior, against which it would have' the unequivocal duty to
protect the public. LC. $ 6-904A(2) was intended to render the state
immune from the unpredictable acts of third persons, including ... persons
under the state's custody, supervision or care.
Havvis, 123 Idaho at 299 (emphasis in original),
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The effect of the statutory scheme provided under the ITCA "is to require a heightened
showing of recklessness, as opposed to mere negligence, for [negligent supervision] claims. In
this way, '[tlhe statute protects against ordinary negligence claims which would significantly
impair effective governmental process, yet allows fair compensation for egregious wrongs'."

Sherer, 143 Idaho at 491, quoting Harris, 123 Idaho at 301.
In the instant case, to have the quantum of evidence demonstrating the requisite
"foreseeability of the specific harm" as stated in Harris thereby providing the required notice
that a student was "highly likely" to be murdered by another student, specific, admissible
evidence is required showing Respondents had clear, unambiguous, direct notice that Draper and
Adamcik had the ability, the opportunity and the motive to murder Stoddart or other students,
and that the evidence indicated a present intent, direction or trend toward taking another's life
such that the threat was imminent. Harris, 123 Idaho at 299 (to talte a governmental entity
outside the protection of the ITCA, there must exist evidence that the "specific harm" must be
"manifest and ostensible and highly likely to occur"). In other words, to take Respondents
outside the ITCA's immunity provision, the notice provided to Respondents must be so clear that
it would appear obvious and unanlbiguous to a reasonable school employee that the students
were actually planning to murder another student. Id., see also, Carrier, 142 Idaho at 808-09,

interpreting, LC. $33-512B. Obviously, no such evidence exists in this case.
Quite simply, Appellants have identified no evidence which would cause one to
reasonably conclude that Respondents knew Draper and Adamcik were obviously about to
commit a heinous murder. At no time has anyone said: "Of course, we h e w those boys were
going to Itill Stoddart and a few others if they could. It was obvious those boys were ltillers." To
the contrary, it was a shock to all in the community that such ordinary boys committed such a
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horrible crime. (Cotant depo., 11:ll-14:6, C.R. Vol. I, pp.75-76; Parker depo., 10~14-11:19,
21:16-21, 22:4-7, C.R. Vol. 11, pp.194, 196, 197.) And to hold a SCHOOL DISTRICT
responsible, where neither a police department,'' nor parents'9 could be found liable in tort under
the same circumstances would be a gross misinterpretation of Idaho law. Such a perverse result
demonstrates one of the reasons why the immunity provisions of the ITCA require such a high
level of foreseeability to justify the imposition of liability on a governmental entity for an alleged

failure to supervise the unpredictable act of third persons in its care. L C. $$ 6-904A(2), 6-904C.
In this case, the remote evidence from 2004, which was thoroughly investigated by
Respondents and found Draper did not pose a threat to students, does not satisfy the
foreseeability requirement of the ITCA. Similarly, the vague, contradicted testimony of
Samantha Chandler also fails to meet the strict foreseeability requirements of LC. $6-904C, and
cannot form the basis for taking Respondents outside the immunity afforded by I.C. $ 6-904A(2).
Thus, as in Harris, according to the strictures of the foreseeability test, there is no evidence in the
record to indicate that Respondents intentionally and Icnowingly did or failed to do any act which
created an unreasonable risk of harm to Stoddart. Specifically, no act or omission of its
employees involved a high degree of probability that the kind of harm which Stoddart suljred

would result therefrom. Therefore, Respondents' employees did not act with reckless, willful,
and wanton conduct with respect to their supervision of Draper and Adamcik, and the District
Court's grant of summary judgment should therefore be affirmed. Harris, 123 Idaho at 299; see

also, Brooks 11, 130 Idaho at 576.

18

Dore, 31 P.3d at 795-96 (held no duty for police to prevent murder of wife even with notice of husband's threats
to kill her); see, Udy, 136 Idaho at 391 (no duty for sheriff to remove rocks or warn others even though it was
foreseeable that the rocks could pose a risk of harm to others).
19
Parents cannot be found liable for the economic loss caused by the torts of their children arising from claims for
"pain and suffering, wrongful death or emotional dish.ess." LC j 6-210(2).
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V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the issues presented in this appeal should be determined
as follows:
Regarding the first issue, it is clear thk Respoildents did not owe a tort duty to prevent
Stoddart from being murdered after school hours at the home of a relative and fanily friend.

Rife, 127 Idaho at 846. It is well settled law in Idaho that a school district owes a tort duty to
protect its students from foreseeable risks of harm only during the lime the students are in the

district's custody and care. Shever, 143 Idaho at 490. After school has adjourned for the day, the
students are returned to the custody and care of their parents who then assume responsibility Tor
the care of their children. Rife, 127 Idaho at 846. This rule applies even where a school district is
aware of a foreseeable risk of harm lo its students which may occur at a time when the students
are not in the school's custody or control. Marlin, 138 Idaho at 150. Thus, Respondents did not
owe a duty of care to either control the murderers or to protect Stoddart at the time of her murder
at the Contreras home on September 22, 2006. Martin, 138 Idaho at 150; Rife, 127 Idaho at 846.
Similarly, LC. $33-512(4) did not create a new tort or separate cause of action beyond the duty
of care a school district owes to its students. Coonse, 132 Idaho at 807.
Neither did Respondeilts did owe a tort duty to protect Stoddart from fellow students
Draper and Adamcik to prevent her murder aAer school hours while at the Contreras home.

Coughlin, 133 Idaho at 399-400. As a general principle, there is no duty to aid or protect another
not under custody or control. Id. This rule applies to school districts, and Respondents therefore
had no legal obligation to take any steps to prevent Stoddart's murder. Summers, 139 Idaho at
956; Martin, 138 Idaho at 150.
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Regarding i~lvestigations,Respondents did not owe a tort duty of care to conduct a
competent investigation of the information regarding Draper it had allegedly received prior to
Stoddart's murder for the purpose of discovering additional information which could have
possibly made it foreseeable that Draper and Adarncik would murder Stoddart - which would
then require Respondents to take additional steps to prevent the murder. Martin, 138 Idaho at
150 (there is no duty to investigate where there is no duty to act). The duty Appellants claim
required Respondents to conduct a competent investigation is prohibited by the "public duty
rule" which states that a duty to conduct a competent investigation to prevent a crime is required
only under very specific circumstances and when specifically required by statute. Rees, 143
Idaho at 15 (noting that not even police owe a tort duty to investigate to prevent a crime). Such
legislation is clearly not present in this case.
In the event the Court finds Respondents breached a duty to supervise Draper during
school hours under the facts of this case, which Respondents deny, under LC. $ 6-904A(2),
Respondents are nonetheless immune from liability where the alleged negligent supervision of
Draper occurred during school hours and on school property, even though Stoddart's murder
occurred off school property and after school hours. Bvooh 11, 130 Idaho at 577.
Finally, the evidence of Respondents' thorough investigation of Draper two and a half
years prior to Stoddart's murder, and the disputed allegations by Chandler that Draper and
Adamcik posed an unspecified threat of harm and that she had allegedly warned Respondents of
this unspecified threat before Stoddart's murder, are, as a matter of law, insufficient to find the
requisite "reckless, willful and wanton" misconduct on the part of Respondents to take it outside
the scope of immunity otherwise provided by LC. $ 6-904A(2). ITarris, 123 Idaho at 300; see
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also, Brooks I1 130 Idaho at 577 (school district immune even though teacher had received
written evidence of a student's suicidal thoughts prior to his suicide at home).
In addition, Respondents are entitled to their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs on
appeal pursuant to LC. § 12-121 and IAR 41 because this Appeal was brought without legal basis
and no reasonable argument has been made for the extension or modification of existing law.

Martin, 138 Idaho at 146.
For the above reasons, Respondents respectfully request the Court affirm the decision of
the District Court below in granting summary judgment to Respondents as there exists no
genuine issue of material fact regarding any of the underlying claims, and Respondents are
therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Coonse, 132 Idaho at 806-07.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this=

C?-

day of August, 2009.

ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP

Attorneys for DefendantsIRespondents
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